Shared by greenribbit on Thingiverse:

I wanted a way to keep my DuPont wires together and organized but wasn’t a big fan of the big clunky comb-style organizers. So I made my own!

This organizer can hold about 20 to 22 wires at a time. The wires I have are about 195mm long (excluding the plastic connectors). Fully packet, the organizer has a foot print of roughly 25mm by 125 mm.

Keep in mind I print with a 0.8mm nozzle @ 0.4mm layer height. So, this model is optimized for that configuration. It should print fine if you use a different nozzle diameter and layer height, but no guarantees!

There is a slight technique to inserting the wires into the organizer. Basically, hold the organizer in one hand, and press the wire against the slot with the thumb on that hand, while using your other hand to kind of “wind” the wire around the curve. I know, I know…trust me it is easier than it sounds and it keeps your wires nice and snug!

Download the files and learn more

Every Thursday is #3dthursday here at Adafruit! The DIY 3D printing community has passion and dedication for making solid objects from digital models. Recently, we have noticed electronics projects integrated with 3D printed enclosures, brackets, and sculptures, so each Thursday we celebrate and highlight these bold pioneers!

Have you considered building a 3D project around an Arduino or other microcontroller? How about printing a bracket to mount your Raspberry Pi to the back of your HD monitor? And don’t forget the countless LED projects that are possible when you are modeling your projects in 3D!

If you have never heard of the Bellmac-32, you aren’t alone. But it is a good bet that most, if not all, of the CPUs in your devices today use technology pioneered by this early 32-bit CPU. The chip was honored with the IEEE Milestone award, and [Willie Jones] explains why in a recent post in Spectrum.

The chip dates from the late 1970s. AT&T’s Bell Labs had a virtual monopoly on phones in the United States, but that was changing, and the government was pressing for divestiture. However, regulators finally allowed Bell to enter the computing market. There was only one problem: everyone else had a huge head start.

There was only one thing to do. There was no point in trying to catch the leaders. Bell decided to leap ahead of the pack. In a time when 8-bit processors were the norm and there were nascent 16-bit processors, they produced a 32-bit processor that ran at a — for the time — snappy 2 MHz.

At the time (1978), most chips used PMOS or NMOS transistors, but Bellmac-32 used CMOS and was made to host compiled C programs. Problems with CMOS were often addressed using dynamic logic, but Bell used a different technique, domino logic, to meet their goals.

Domino logic lets devices cascade like falling dominoes in between clock pulses. By 1980, the device reached 2 MHz, and a second generation could reach speeds of up to 9 MHz. For contrast, the Intel 8088 from 1981 ran at 4.77 MHz and handled, at most, half the data in a given time period as the Bellmac-32. Of course, the 68000 was out a year earlier, but you could argue it was a 16-bit CPU, despite some 32-bit features.

It is fun to imagine what life would be like today if we had fast 32-bit Unix machines widely available in the early 1980s. History has shown that many of Bellmac’s decisions were correct. CMOS was the future. Many of the design and testing techniques would go on to become standard operating procedure across the industry. But, as for the Bellmac-32, it didn’t really get the attention it deserved. It did go on in the AT&T 3B computers as the WE 32×00 family of CPUs.

You can check out a 1982 promo video about the CPU below, which also explains domino logic. Instruction sets have changed a bit since then. You can see a 68000 and 8086 face off, and imagine how the Bellmac would have done in comparison.

Equipped with a tiny red house from Swedish artist Mikael Genberg, the Tenacious rover is just about the cutest rover there ever was! MSN.com reports:

Mr Genbeg has been trying to get his art to the moon for 25 years, said Dr Lamamy, “but 25 years ago, only space agencies were going to the Moon”.

“To me, that reflects what we’re here for,” he said. “Of course, we’re here to contribute to science and exploration and knowledge about the moon, but we’re also here to give access to other folks that have cool projects.”

Read more here.

Via Bruce Sterling on Mastodon

There’s a new cybersecurity awareness campaign: Take9. The idea is that people—you, me, everyone—should just pause for nine seconds and think more about the link they are planning to click on, the file they are planning to download, or whatever it is they are planning to share.

There’s a website—of course—and a video, well-produced and scary. But the campaign won’t do much to improve cybersecurity. The advice isn’t reasonable, it won’t make either individuals or nations appreciably safer, and it deflects blame from the real causes of our cyberspace insecurities.

First, the advice is not realistic. A nine-second pause is an eternity in something as routine as using your computer or phone. Try it; use a timer. Then think about how many links you click on and how many things you forward or reply to. Are we pausing for nine seconds after every text message? Every Slack ping? Does the clock reset if someone replies midpause? What about browsing—do we pause before clicking each link, or after every page loads? The logistics quickly become impossible. I doubt they tested the idea on actual users.

Second, it largely won’t help. The industry should know because we tried it a decade ago. “Stop. Think. Connect.” was an awareness campaign from 2016, by the Department of Homeland Security—this was before CISA—and the National Cybersecurity Alliance. The message was basically the same: Stop and think before doing anything online. It didn’t work then, either.

Take9’s website says, “Science says: In stressful situations, wait 10 seconds before responding.” The problem with that is that clicking on a link is not a stressful situation. It’s normal, one that happens hundreds of times a day. Maybe you can train a person to count to 10 before punching someone in a bar but not before opening an attachment.

And there is no basis in science for it. It’s a folk belief, all over the Internet but with no actual research behind it—like the five-second rule when you drop food on the floor. In emotionally charged contexts, most people are already overwhelmed, cognitively taxed, and not functioning in a space where rational interruption works as neatly as this advice suggests.

Pausing Adds Little

Pauses help us break habits. If we are clicking, sharing, linking, downloading, and connecting out of habit, a pause to break that habit works. But the problem here isn’t habit alone. The problem is that people aren’t able to differentiate between something legitimate and an attack.

The Take9 website says that nine seconds is “time enough to make a better decision,” but there’s no use telling people to stop and think if they don’t know what to think about after they’ve stopped. Pause for nine seconds and… do what? Take9 offers no guidance. It presumes people have the cognitive tools to understand the myriad potential attacks and figure out which one of the thousands of Internet actions they take is harmful. If people don’t have the right knowledge, pausing for longer—even a minute—will do nothing to add knowledge.

The three-part suspicion, cognition, and automaticity model (SCAM) is one way to think about this. The first is lack of knowledge—not knowing what’s risky and what isn’t. The second is habits: people doing what they always do. And third, using flawed mental shortcuts, like believing PDFs to be safer than Microsoft Word documents, or that mobile devices are safer than computers for opening suspicious emails.

These pathways don’t always occur in isolation; sometimes they happen together or sequentially. They can influence each other or cancel each other out. For example, a lack of knowledge can lead someone to rely on flawed mental shortcuts, while those same shortcuts can reinforce that lack of knowledge. That’s why meaningful behavioral change requires more than just a pause; it needs cognitive scaffolding and system designs that account for these dynamic interactions.

A successful awareness campaign would do more than tell people to pause. It would guide them through a two-step process. First trigger suspicion, motivating them to look more closely. Then, direct their attention by telling them what to look at and how to evaluate it. When both happen, the person is far more likely to make a better decision.

This means that pauses need to be context specific. Think about email readers that embed warnings like “EXTERNAL: This email is from an address outside your organization” or “You have not received an email from this person before.” Those are specifics, and useful. We could imagine an AI plug-in that warns: “This isn’t how Bruce normally writes.” But of course, there’s an arms race in play; the bad guys will use these systems to figure out how to bypass them.

This is all hard. The old cues aren’t there anymore. Current phishing attacks have evolved from those older Nigerian scams filled with grammar mistakes and typos. Text message, voice, or video scams are even harder to detect. There isn’t enough context in a text message for the system to flag. In voice or video, it’s much harder to trigger suspicion without disrupting the ongoing conversation. And all the false positives, when the system flags a legitimate conversation as a potential scam, work against people’s own intuition. People will just start ignoring their own suspicions, just as most people ignore all sorts of warnings that their computer puts in their way.

Even if we do this all well and correctly, we can’t make people immune to social engineering. Recently, both cyberspace activist Cory Doctorow and security researcher Troy Hunt—two people who you’d expect to be excellent scam detectors—got phished. In both cases, it was just the right message at just the right time.

It’s even worse if you’re a large organization. Security isn’t based on the average employee’s ability to detect a malicious email; it’s based on the worst person’s inability—the weakest link. Even if awareness raises the average, it won’t help enough.

Don’t Place Blame Where It Doesn’t Belong

Finally, all of this is bad public policy. The Take9 campaign tells people that they can stop cyberattacks by taking a pause and making a better decision. What’s not said, but certainly implied, is that if they don’t take that pause and don’t make those better decisions, then they’re to blame when the attack occurs.

That’s simply not true, and its blame-the-user message is one of the worst mistakes our industry makes. Stop trying to fix the user. It’s not the user’s fault if they click on a link and it infects their system. It’s not their fault if they plug in a strange USB drive or ignore a warning message that they can’t understand. It’s not even their fault if they get fooled by a look-alike bank website and lose their money. The problem is that we’ve designed these systems to be so insecure that regular, nontechnical people can’t use them with confidence. We’re using security awareness campaigns to cover up bad system design. Or, as security researcher Angela Sasse first said in 1999: “Users are not the enemy.”

We wouldn’t accept that in other parts of our lives. Imagine Take9 in other contexts. Food service: “Before sitting down at a restaurant, take nine seconds: Look in the kitchen, maybe check the temperature of the cooler, or if the cooks’ hands are clean.” Aviation: “Before boarding a plane, take nine seconds: Look at the engine and cockpit, glance at the plane’s maintenance log, ask the pilots if they feel rested.” This is obviously ridiculous advice. The average person doesn’t have the training or expertise to evaluate restaurant or aircraft safety—and we don’t expect them to. We have laws and regulations in place that allow people to eat at a restaurant or board a plane without worry.

But—we get it—the government isn’t going to step in and regulate the Internet. These insecure systems are what we have. Security awareness training, and the blame-the-user mentality that comes with it, are all we have. So if we want meaningful behavioral change, it needs a lot more than just a pause. It needs cognitive scaffolding and system designs that account for all the dynamic interactions that go into a decision to click, download, or share. And that takes real work—more work than just an ad campaign and a slick video.

This essay was written with Arun Vishwanath, and originally appeared in Dark Reading.