GitHub user lhm0 has posted an interesting project:

This project provides a custom 3D-printed breadboard body designed to accommodate modern, wide microcontroller development boards such as the Raspberry Pi Pico, ESP32 Dev Board, and Arduino Nano. The metal spring contacts from a standard commercial breadboard are removed and reused inside the new housing, giving you a full-size 63×5 contact area and two power rails — just like the real thing.

Why?

Many modern µC boards are too wide for typical solderless breadboards:

• With a Raspberry Pi Pico, only two holes per pin remain usable.
• With an ESP32 Dev Board, no holes remain at all — you need two breadboards side by side.

With this custom breadboard, the microcontroller sits in the middle, leaving four free holes per pin for jumper wires and components — ideal for prototyping.

Check out the 3D design files in the GitHub repository. Via CNX Software.

You might have seen Policy will reject signature within a year warnings in apt(-get) update runs like this:

root@424812bd4556:/# apt update
Get:1 http://foo.example.org/debian demo InRelease [4229 B]
Hit:2 http://deb.debian.org/debian trixie InRelease
Hit:3 http://deb.debian.org/debian trixie-updates InRelease
Hit:4 http://deb.debian.org/debian-security trixie-security InRelease
Get:5 http://foo.example.org/debian demo/main amd64 Packages [1097 B]
Fetched 5326 B in 0s (43.2 kB/s)
All packages are up to date.
Warning: http://foo.example.org/debian/dists/demo/InRelease: Policy will reject signature within a year, see --audit for details

root@424812bd4556:/# apt --audit update
Hit:1 http://foo.example.org/debian demo InRelease
Hit:2 http://deb.debian.org/debian trixie InRelease
Hit:3 http://deb.debian.org/debian trixie-updates InRelease
Hit:4 http://deb.debian.org/debian-security trixie-security InRelease
All packages are up to date.    
Warning:  http://foo.example.org/debian/dists/demo/InRelease: Policy will reject signature within a year, see --audit for details
Audit:  http://foo.example.org/debian/dists/demo/InRelease: Sub-process /usr/bin/sqv returned an error code (1), error message is:
   Signing key on 54321ABCD6789ABCD0123ABCD124567ABCD89123 is not bound:
              No binding signature at time 2024-06-19T10:33:47Z
     because: Policy rejected non-revocation signature (PositiveCertification) requiring second pre-image resistance
     because: SHA1 is not considered secure since 2026-02-01T00:00:00Z
Audit: The sources.list(5) entry for 'http://foo.example.org/debian' should be upgraded to deb822 .sources
Audit: Missing Signed-By in the sources.list(5) entry for 'http://foo.example.org/debian'
Audit: Consider migrating all sources.list(5) entries to the deb822 .sources format
Audit: The deb822 .sources format supports both embedded as well as external OpenPGP keys
Audit: See apt-secure(8) for best practices in configuring repository signing.
Audit: Some sources can be modernized. Run 'apt modernize-sources' to do so.

If you ignored this for the last year, I would like to tell you that 2026-02-01 is not that far away (hello from the past if you’re reading this because you’re already affected).

Let’s simulate the future:

root@424812bd4556:/# apt --update -y install faketime
[...]
root@424812bd4556:/# export LD_PRELOAD=/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/faketime/libfaketime.so.1 FAKETIME="2026-08-29 23:42:11" 
root@424812bd4556:/# date
Sat Aug 29 23:42:11 UTC 2026

root@424812bd4556:/# apt update
Get:1 http://foo.example.org/debian demo InRelease [4229 B]
Hit:2 http://deb.debian.org/debian trixie InRelease                                 
Err:1 http://foo.example.org/debian demo InRelease
  Sub-process /usr/bin/sqv returned an error code (1), error message is: Signing key on 54321ABCD6789ABCD0123ABCD124567ABCD89123 is not bound:            No binding signature at time 2024-06-19T10:33:47Z   because: Policy rejected non-revocation signature (PositiveCertification) requiring second pre-image resistance   because: SHA1 is not considered secure since 2026-02-01T00:00:00Z
[...]
Warning: An error occurred during the signature verification. The repository is not updated and the previous index files will be used. OpenPGP signature verification failed: http://foo.example.org/debian demo InRelease: Sub-process /usr/bin/sqv returned an error code (1), error message is: Signing key on 54321ABCD6789ABCD0123ABCD124567ABCD89123 is not bound:            No binding signature at time 2024-06-19T10:33:47Z   because: Policy rejected non-revocation signature (PositiveCertification) requiring second pre-image resistance   because: SHA1 is not considered secure since 2026-02-01T00:00:00Z
[...]
root@424812bd4556:/# echo $?
100

Now, the proper solution would have been to fix the signing key underneath (via e.g. sq cert lint &dash&dashfix &dash&dashcert-file $PRIVAT_KEY_FILE > $PRIVAT_KEY_FILE-fixed).

If you don’t have access to the according private key (e.g. when using an upstream repository that has been ignoring this issue), you’re out of luck for a proper fix.

But there’s a workaround for the apt situation (related see apt commit 0989275c2f7afb7a5f7698a096664a1035118ebf):

root@424812bd4556:/# cat /usr/share/apt/default-sequoia.config
# Default APT Sequoia configuration. To overwrite, consider copying this
# to /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/apt-sequoia.config and modify the
# desired values.
[asymmetric_algorithms]
dsa2048 = 2024-02-01
dsa3072 = 2024-02-01
dsa4096 = 2024-02-01
brainpoolp256 = 2028-02-01
brainpoolp384 = 2028-02-01
brainpoolp512 = 2028-02-01
rsa2048  = 2030-02-01

[hash_algorithms]
sha1.second_preimage_resistance = 2026-02-01    # Extend the expiry for legacy repositories
sha224 = 2026-02-01

[packets]
signature.v3 = 2026-02-01   # Extend the expiry

Adjust this according to your needs:

root@424812bd4556:/# mkdir -p /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/

root@424812bd4556:/# cp /usr/share/apt/default-sequoia.config /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/apt-sequoia.config

root@424812bd4556:/# $EDITOR /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/apt-sequoia.config

root@424812bd4556:/# cat /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/apt-sequoia.config
# APT Sequoia override configuration
[asymmetric_algorithms]
dsa2048 = 2024-02-01
dsa3072 = 2024-02-01
dsa4096 = 2024-02-01
brainpoolp256 = 2028-02-01
brainpoolp384 = 2028-02-01
brainpoolp512 = 2028-02-01
rsa2048  = 2030-02-01

[hash_algorithms]
sha1.second_preimage_resistance = 2026-09-01    # Extend the expiry for legacy repositories
sha224 = 2026-09-01

[packets]
signature.v3 = 2026-02-01   # Extend the expiry

Then we’re back into the original situation, being a warning instead of an error:

root@424812bd4556:/# apt update
Hit:1 http://deb.debian.org/debian trixie InRelease
Get:2 http://foo.example.org/debian demo InRelease [4229 B]
Hit:3 http://deb.debian.org/debian trixie-updates InRelease
Hit:4 http://deb.debian.org/debian-security trixie-security InRelease
Warning: http://foo.example.org/debian/dists/demo/InRelease: Policy will reject signature within a year, see --audit for details
[..]

Please note that this is a workaround, and not a proper solution.

The Xfce team has announced that it will be providing funding to Brian Tarricone to work on xfwl4, a Wayland compositor for Xfce:

Xfwl4 will not be based on the existing xfwm4 code. Instead, it will be written from scratch in rust, using smithay building blocks.

The first attempt at creating an Xfce Wayland compositor involved modifying the existing xfwm4 code to support both X11 and Wayland in parallel. However, this approach turned out to be the wrong path forward for several reasons:

• Xfwm4 is architected in a way that makes it very difficult to put the window management behavior behind generic interfaces that don't include X11 specifics.
• Refactoring Xfwm4 is risky, since it might introduce new bugs to X11. Having two parallel code bases will allow for rapid development and experimentation with the Wayland compositor, with zero risk to break xfwm4.
• Some X11 window management concepts just aren't available or supported by Wayland protocols at this time, and dealing with those differences can be difficult in an X11-first code base.
• Using the existing codebase would require us to use C and wlroots, even if a better alternative is available.

Work has already commenced on the project, and the project hopes to share a development release in mid-2026.